Preselection and expert advice

Elisabeth Schulte () and Mike Felgenhauer
Additional contact information
Elisabeth Schulte: Philipps-Universität Marburg

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 3, No 5, 693-714

Abstract: Abstract We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.

Keywords: Reputation; Cheap talk; Safe haven (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Preselection and Expert Advice (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0551-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().