EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An egalitarian solution to minimum cost spanning tree problems

Emre Doğan () and İbrahim Barış Esmerok
Additional contact information
Emre Doğan: HSE University
İbrahim Barış Esmerok: AES Clean Energy Services, LLC

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 1, No 5, 127-141

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a new core selection to minimum cost spanning tree problems satisfying continuity, population and cost monotonicity, solidarity, and ranking. We prove that it Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the irreducible core of the problem, including the celebrated folk solution unless they yield the same outcome. Therefore, among the core selections satisfying solidarity, our solution generates the most egalitarian outcome for each problem.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree; Egalitarianism; Lorenz domination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-023-00864-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00864-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00864-1

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-06
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00864-1