Incentivizing hidden types in secretary problem

Longjian Li () and Alexis Akira Toda ()
Additional contact information
Longjian Li: New York University
Alexis Akira Toda: Emory University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 2, 21 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study a game between N job applicants who incur a cost $$c\in [0,1)$$ c ∈ [ 0 , 1 ) (relative to the job value) to reveal their type during interviews and an administrator who seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best applicant. We define a full learning equilibrium and prove its existence, uniqueness, and optimality. In full learning equilibrium, the administrator accepts the current best applicant n with probability c if $$n

Keywords: Learning; Optimal stopping; Secretary problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-025-00922-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00922-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00922-w

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().