Nash’s demand game and resource-allocation

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
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Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 18, 14 pages

Abstract: Abstract I consider Nash’s demand game (NDG) in the context of resource-allocation, rather than in the abstract utility space. If the resource is one-dimensional, the known results from the NDG literature are recovered: either the Nash solution is uniquely supported at the perturbations’ limit, or the entire (relative interior of the) Pareto frontier is supported; which case obtains depends on the type of perturbation. I show that, contrary to the prominence of the Nash solution under smoothing in the utility space, the entire frontier can be supported under a variety of economically-plausible perturbations. The case where the resource is multi-dimensional is qualitatively different.

Keywords: Nash demand game; Nash bargaining solution; Perturbations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00941-7

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