Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games

Kohei Kawamura () and Vasileios Vlaseros ()
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Kohei Kawamura: Waseda University
Vasileios Vlaseros: American College of Greece

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 2, No 8, 475-492

Abstract: Abstract We develop a unified derivation of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and their optimality in the canonical common interest voting model of Austen-Smith and Banks (Am Polit Sci Rev 90(1):34–45, 1996). We also study the relationship between the most efficient equilibria, which have a remarkably simple and intuitive structure, and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that has been commonly studied in the literature. In particular, while the efficiency in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium under unanimity rule is known to be decreasing in the number of voters, the efficiency does not depend on the number of voters above a threshold in the most efficient equilibria.

Keywords: Committee decision making; Asymmetric equilibria; Public information; Private information; Strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00886-3

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