Evolution of preferences in multiple populations

Yu-Sung Tu () and Wei-Torng Juang ()
Additional contact information
Yu-Sung Tu: Academia Sinica
Wei-Torng Juang: Academia Sinica

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 1, No 9, 259 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and the information about the opponents’ preferences. Individuals’ realized fitnesses are given by material payoff functions. Following Dekel et al. (Rev Econ Stud 74:685–704, 2007), we assume that individuals observe their opponents’ preferences with probability p. We first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for stability for $$p=1$$ p = 1 and $$p=0$$ p = 0 , and then check the robustness of our results against small perturbations on observability for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.

Keywords: Evolution of preferences; Indirect evolutionary approach; Asymmetric game; Evolutionary stability; Observability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-023-00869-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00869-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00869-w

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().