A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles

Francesc Dilmé ()
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Francesc Dilmé: University of Bonn

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 2, No 16, 673-693

Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a new characterization of belief consistency in extensive games. We show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with the property that all actions with vanishing probability are played according to power functions of the sequence index. The result makes it simpler to prove or disprove that a given assessment is consistent, facilitating the use of sequential equilibria.

Keywords: Belief consistency; Sequential equilibria; Power sequences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00874-z

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