Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains

Mihir Bhattacharya () and Ojasvi Khare ()
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Mihir Bhattacharya: Ashoka University
Ojasvi Khare: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 3, No 8, 893-911

Abstract: Abstract We consider a social choice model where voters have single-peaked preferences over a finite and ordered set of alternatives that are aggregated to produce contiguous sets or intervals of a fixed cardinality. This is applicable in situations where the alternatives can be arranged in a line (e.g. plots of land) and a contiguous subset of these is required (e.g. a hospital or a school). We define interval-social choice correspondences (I-SCCs) on profiles of single-peaked preferences which select intervals. We extend single-peaked preferences to intervals using responsiveness. We show that generalized median-interval (GMI) rules are the only strategy-proof, anonymous and interval efficient I-SCCs. These rules are interval versions of generalized median voter rules which consist of the median, min and max rules. We show that responsiveness over intervals is necessary for the strategy-proofness of the GMI rule if preferences over alternatives are single-peaked.

Keywords: Social choice correspondence; Interval; Single-peaked preferences; Responsive; Strategy-proofness; Median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00900-8

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