Large incomplete-information games with independent types

Guilherme Carmona () and Konrad Podczeck ()
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Guilherme Carmona: University of Surrey
Konrad Podczeck: Universität Wien

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 6, 17 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider Bayes–Nash equilibria of large semi-anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff is determined by his type, his action, and the distribution of the realized types and choices of the others). In a model with finite type and action spaces, we provide a characterization of limits of sequences of Bayes-Nash equilibria as the number of players goes to infinity. Based on this, we show that strict pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions and type distributions.

Keywords: Large games; Pure strategy; Bayes–Nash equilibrium; Generic property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8

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