Discrimination in games under the veil of ignorance

Annick Laruelle () and André Rocha
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Annick Laruelle: University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
André Rocha: Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 3, 13 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study descriptive norms under the veil of ignorance in symmetric coordination and anti-coordination games. We consider a finite population formed by different types of individuals. Players observe the type of their opponent but play under the veil of ignorance, i.e., act as if they did not know their own type. The question that we address is whether in such a symmetric environment a discriminating norm may arise. We show that there exist symmetric Nash equilibria in which players discriminate by acting differently according to the type of opponent that they face in anti-coordination games, while no such equilibrium exists in coordination games. Whenever individuals display a discriminating behavior, it is equally adopted by all agents, including by the individuals of the discriminated group. However, discrimination has a limit: the maximum number of groups where the treatment differs is three.

Keywords: Discrimination; Veil of ignorance; Diversity; Minority; Working memory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00925-7

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