Note on Gale’s conjecture in one-sided matching problems

Hidekazu Anno ()
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Hidekazu Anno: University of Tsukuba

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 14, 12 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of stochastically allocating n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent assigns cardinal utility values to the objects. In this context, Zhou (1990) demonstrates Gale’s conjecture in a stronger form: No rule is strategy-proof, ex ante efficient, and symmetric. We further strengthen this impossibility theorem by relaxing the requirement of symmetry. Consequently, we indicate that every strategy-proof and ex ante efficient rule satisfies neither symmetry nor the equal division lower bound.

Keywords: Matching; Lottery rule; Strategy-proofness; Ex ante efficiency; C78; D47; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00937-3

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