The best experienced payoff dynamic in the ultimatum minigame

Ratul Lahkar () and Amarjyoti Mahanta ()
Additional contact information
Ratul Lahkar: Ashoka University
Amarjyoti Mahanta: IIT Guwahati

International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, No 17, 30 pages

Abstract: Abstract In the ultimatum minigame, proposers can offer either half the total prize or a minimal quantity (e.g., 1). Responders can accept or reject. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, proposers offer the minimal quantity and responders accept. We apply the best experienced payoff (BEP) dynamic to the large population version of this game. The BEP dynamic is generated when players try their strategies a certain number of times and choose the strategy that generates the highest average payoff. We establish conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium is stable or unstable. If it is unstable, another stable state can arise where a significant fraction of proposers make high offers.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Evolutionary game theory; Best experienced payoff dynamics; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-025-00942-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00942-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00942-6

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().