Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?

János Flesch (), Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva ()
Additional contact information
János Flesch: Maastricht University
Anna Zseleva: Maastricht University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 2, No 17, 695-723

Abstract: Abstract We examine infinite horizon decision problems with arbitrary bounded payoff functions in which the decision maker uses finitely additive behavioral strategies. Since we only assume that the payoff function is bounded, it is well-known that these behavioral strategies generally do not induce unambiguously defined expected payoffs. Consequently, it is not clear how to compare behavioral strategies and define optimality. We address this problem by finding conditions on the payoff function that guarantee an unambiguous expected payoff regardless of which behavioral strategy the decision maker uses. To this end, we systematically consider various alternatives proposed in the literature on how to define the finitely additive probability measure on the set of infinite plays induced by a behavioral strategy.

Keywords: Infinite duration decision problem; Behavioral strategy; Expected payoff; Finitely additive probability measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-024-00892-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-024-00892-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00892-5

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().