Domains where the uniform rule is well behaved

Souvik Roy () and Soumyarup Sadhukhan ()
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Souvik Roy: Indian Statistical Institute
Soumyarup Sadhukhan: Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 3, No 14, 1033-1071

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of dividing one unit of an infinitely divisible object among a finite number of agents. We provide a characterization of all single-peaked domains on which the uniform rule is the unique division rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals (ETE). Next, we consider non-single-peaked domains and provide a characterization of all such domains on which the uniform rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, and ETE. We also show that under some mild richness conditions the uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying the mentioned properties on these domains. Finally, we provide a wide range of applications to justify the usefulness of our results.

Keywords: Division problems; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Equal treatment of equals; Single-peaked preferences; Non-single-peaked preferences; The uniform rule; 91B14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00906-2

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