Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game

Gustavo Bergantiños () and Juan Moreno-Ternero
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Gustavo Bergantiños: Universidade de Vigo, ECOSOT

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 3, No 11, 977-988

Abstract: Abstract We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.

Keywords: Broadcasting rights; Cooperative games; Core; Shapley value; Axioms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00894-3

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