The Population Lotto Game: how strategic resource allocation structures non-transitive outcomes in pairwise competitions

Giovanni Artiglio, Aiden Youkhana and Joel Nishimura ()
Additional contact information
Giovanni Artiglio: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Aiden Youkhana: Arizona State University: West Valley Campus
Joel Nishimura: Arizona State University: West Valley Campus

International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53, issue 3, No 9, 913-937

Abstract: Abstract In order to understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pair-wise competition outcomes in human competitions we introduce a new multiplayer resource allocation game, the Population Lotto Game. This new game allows agents to allocate their resources across a continuum of possible specializations. While this game allows non-transitive cycles between players, we show that the Nash equilibrium of the game also forms a hierarchical structure between discrete ‘leagues’ based on their different resource budgets, with potential sub-league structure and/or non-transitive cycles inside individual leagues. We provide an algorithm that can find a particular Nash equilibrium for any finite set of discrete sub-population sizes and budgets. Further, our algorithm finds the unique Nash equilibrium that remains stable for the subset of players with budgets below any threshold.

Keywords: Non-transitive outcomes; Resource allocation; Colonel Blotto; Continuous game; Continuous General Lotto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-024-00891-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-024-00891-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00891-6

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().