The Kernel for Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game

Kensaku Kikuta
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Kensaku Kikuta: Faculty of Economics, Toyama University, Gofuku 3190, Toyama 930, Japan

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 1, 59 pages

Abstract: It is shown that the prekernel and the pre-nucleolus of a cooperative game coincide with the kernel and the nucleolus for the reasonable set of the game respectively.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received September 1994 Revision version June 1995
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