A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games

Yukihiko Funaki (), Kees Hoede and Harry Aarts
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Kees Hoede: Faculty of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands
Harry Aarts: Faculty of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 1, 97-111

Abstract: In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received November 1993
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