On the Core of Routing Games

Jean Derks and Jeroen Kuipers
Additional contact information
Jeroen Kuipers: Department of Mathematics, Faculty of General Sciences, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 2, 193-205

Abstract: A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, called routing game, is associated with this allocation problem, and an {\cal O}(n2) algorithm is given which computes a core element of a routing game if the core is non-empty. The non-emptiness of the core depends on the tour which is traversed by the repairman. Several procedures are given to construct tours which guarantee the non-emptiness of the core.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received May 1993 Revised version May 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:193-205

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().