On the Infiltration Game

P. Goutal, Andrey Garnaev and G. Garnaeva
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P. Goutal: Institut de Protection et de Sureté Nucléaire, B.P. 6, 92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France
G. Garnaeva: Institute of Physics, 0N0I, Saint Petersburg State University, Star.Petergoff, Uljanovskaya 1, Saint Petersburg 198904, Russia

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 2, 215-221

Abstract: An infiltrator tries to go through a graph of n arcs, within a time limit, without being caught by a guard. The latter is allowed a restricted number of tentatives to catch the infiltrator. This paper describes optimal strategies and gives the value of this discrete zero-sum infiltration game.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received December 1992 Revised version September 1995
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