A Note on Repeated Games with Non-Monotonic Value

Leeat Yariv
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Leeat Yariv: School of Mathematical Sciences, Raymond and Beverly Sackler, Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 2, 229-234

Abstract: We show that even when the information structure is independent of the state of nature, the value of the n-stage zero-sum game with incomplete information is not necessarily monotonic with respect to the length of the game. More precisely, we give an example of such an n-stage game in which $V_{1} > V_{2}

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received: March 1995 Revised Version: August 1995
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