Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Janos Flesch, Frank Thuijsman and Koos Vrieze
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Janos Flesch: Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Frank Thuijsman: Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Koos Vrieze: Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 3, 303-314

Abstract: We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary $\epsilon $-equilibria $(\epsilon > 0)$ do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received: September 1995 Revised Version: February 1996
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