Minimum Cost Forest Games

Jeroen Kuipers
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Jeroen Kuipers: Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 3, 367-377

Abstract: In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes to be connected. We show that the core of such a game may be empty, but that it is always non-empty if there is at least one customer who wants to be connected to all suppliers. Furthermore, the core is always non-empty if there are at most two suppliers.

Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received February 1995 Revised version March 1996
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