Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes
Frank Thuijsman () and
Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan ()
Additional contact information
Frank Thuijsman: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, email: frank@math.unimaas.nl
Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan: Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, 851 South Morgan Room 517, Chicago, IL 60607-7045, USA email: t.e.raghavan@uicvm.cc.uic.edu
International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, vol. 26, issue 3, 403-408
Abstract:
For n-person perfect information stochastic games and for n-person stochastic games with Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average $ \epsilon $-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.
Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received September 1994 Revised version March 1995 Final version June 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:403-408
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().