Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games

Amit Pazgal
Additional contact information
Amit Pazgal: Department of Managerial Economics and Decisions Sciences, Kellog Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston IL, 60208, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 26, issue 4, 439-453

Abstract: We study the play of mutual interests games by satisficing decision makers. We show that, for a high enough initial aspiration level, and under certain assumptions of "tremble," there is a high probability (close to unity) of convergence to the Pareto dominant cooperative outcome. Simulations indicate that the theoretical result is robust with respect to the "trembling" mechanism.

Date: 1998-05-19
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:439-453

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().