On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies

Yves Sprumont ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 26, issue 4, 455-472

Abstract: The paper characterizes the class of transferable-utility cooperative games arising from public-good economies. In the symmetric case and in the three-players case, this class is precisely that of convex games. In general, a highly structured pattern of differences between the worths of the various coalitions is characteristic of the public-good games. This pattern implies convexity but also many other restrictions. Some of these restrictions express in a formal way the intuition that full cooperation is the only stable form of collective behaviour in public-good economies.

Date: 1998-05-19
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Working Paper: On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies (1995)
Working Paper: On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies (1995)
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