 Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"Stephen Ching
International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 26, issue 4, 473-490 Abstract: We consider the problem of choosing a level of the public good for an economy in which agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). We show that a solution satisfying strategy-proofness and continuity if and only if it is an augmented median-voter solution. An augmented median-voter solution is described in terms of 2n parameters (which satisfy an antimonotonicity condition) as follows: n + 1 of them are selected according to an increasing order of the peaks; the outcome is the median of these n + 1 parameters and the n peaks. This result establishes a formal connection between strategy-proofness and a generalized notion of median voter. (Similar median formulas were used by Moulin (1980) to describe smaller classes of solutions.) We provide an interpretation of these 2n parameters in terms of the following properties: anonymity, voter sovereignty, unanimity, and Pareto efficiency. Keywords: strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; augmented median-voter solutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:473-490 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society |
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