On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set

Stef Tijs and Carles Rafels ()
Additional contact information
Stef Tijs: Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Carles Rafels: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, University of Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain, email: rafels@riscd2.eco.ub.es

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 26, issue 4, 499 pages

Abstract: In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is externally stable. As a consequence we can give a new characterization (th. 3.2) for the convexity of a cooperative game in terms of its stability (von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions) using the Weber set.

Date: 1998-05-19
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:491-499

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().