On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions

Mitsunobu Miyake
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Mitsunobu Miyake: Department of Economics, University of Kagawa, Takamatsu, 760, Japan

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 1, 19 pages

Abstract: In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e., the honest strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, a unique perfect equilibrium and a dominant strategy equilibrium. For each of the three incentive properties, it is shown that the optimal auction is a unique auction satisfying the property. The uniqueness results are derived in a general setting with budget constraints and non-linear utilities.

Keywords: Multi-item; auctions; ·; Nash; equilibrium; ·; perfect; equilibrium; ·; dominant; strategy; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received November 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version March 1997
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