Multi-level evolution in population games

José Canals and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Additional contact information
José Canals: Dept. of Economics, University of Virginia, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 1, 35 pages

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1993) where the population is partitioned into groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-run equilibrium. This provides an explicitly dynamic basis for a conclusion reminiscent of those put forward in the biological literature by the so-called theories group selection. From a normative viewpoint, it suggests the potential importance of "decentralization", here understood as local and independent interaction.

Keywords: Evolution; ·; games; ·; multilevel; ·; group; selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received April 1995/Revised version October 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/8027001/80270021.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:21-35

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().