Economics at your fingertips  

Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers

Mario Pascoa

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 1, 83-92

Abstract: Pascoa (1993a) showed that the failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomizations implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued profile function in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of mixed strategies equilibrium of a nonatomic game. The latter should be defined as a probability measure on pure strategies profiles which is induced by the product measure of players' mixed strategies. This paper addresses existence and approximate purification of the latter and presents an assumption on continuity of payoffs that guarantees the equivalence between the two equilibrium concepts.

Keywords: Nash; equilibrium; ·; nonatomic; game; ·; law; of; large; numbers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received November 1994/Revised version September 1995/Final version May 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2022-05-12
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:83-92