Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation

Tristan Tomala

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 1, 93-109

Abstract: The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and second, the definition of new types of punishments using approachability techniques.

Keywords: Repeated; games; ·; folk; theorem; ·; public; signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-19
Note: Received August 1995/Final version May 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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