On implementation via demand commitment games

Y. Chiu () and Ani Dasgupta
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Ani Dasgupta: Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 189 pages

Abstract: A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.

Keywords: Demand; commitment; game; ·; implementation; ·; Shapley; value; ·; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received March 1995/Final version February 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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