On consistent solutions for strategic games

Graziano Pieri (), Fioravante Patrone (), Anna Torre () and Stef Tijs ()
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Graziano Pieri: Institute of Scientific and Technical Disciplines, Faculty of Architecture, University of Genoa, Stradone S. Agostino 37, I-16123 Genoa, Italy
Fioravante Patrone: Department of Mathematics, University of Genoa, Via Dodecaneso 35, I-16146 Genoa, Italy
Anna Torre: Department of Mathematics, University of Pavia, Via Abbiategrasso 209, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
Stef Tijs: Department of Econometrics, University of Tilburg, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 200 pages

Abstract: Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of "personalized" Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.

Keywords: Consistency; ·; axiomatization; ·; strategic; games; ·; choice; rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received January 1996/Final version December 1996
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