Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abraham Neyman () and Sylvain Sorin

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 210 pages

Abstract: Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Keywords: Repeated; games; of; incomplete; information; ·; stochastic; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received March 1996/Revised version January 1997/Final version May 1997
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