-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

Ehud Lehrer () and Sylvain Sorin

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 244 pages

Abstract: We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.

Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997
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