Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property

Hannu Salonen and Klaus Kultti ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 305-309

Abstract: We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all strictly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated.

Keywords: Strategic; complements; ·; iterated; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received January 1997/Final version June 1997
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