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Characterization sets for the nucleolus

D. Granot (), F. Granot () and W. R. Zhu ()
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D. Granot: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2
F. Granot: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2
W. R. Zhu: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 3, 359-374

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a characterization set for the nucleolus of a cooperative game and develop sufficient conditions for a collection of coalitions to form a characterization set thereof. Further, we formalize Kopelowitz's method for computing the nucleolus through the notion of a sequential LP process, and derive a general relationship between the size of a characterization set and the complexity of computing the nucleolus.

Keywords: Cooperative; game; ·; nucleolus; ·; strongly; polynomial; algorithms; ·; minimum; cost; spanning; tree; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-11-02
Note: Received May 1994/Revised version May 1997/Final version February 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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