Duality and markovian strategies

Dinah Rosenberg

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 4, 577-597

Abstract: We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

Keywords: Incomplete; information; ·; stochastic; games; ·; Fenchel; conjugate; ·; dual; game; ·; Markov; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-16
Note: Received December 1996/Revised version December 1997
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