Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability

Karl Wärneryd

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 4, 599-609

Abstract: In games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex than others in the sense that they induce a finer partition of the set of states of the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modified to take lexicographic complexity preferences into account, then for a class of games of common interest only communication strategies that induce payoff-dominant Nash outcomes of the underlying game are stable.

Keywords: Communication; ·; cheap; talk; ·; common; interest; games; ·; complexity; ·; evolutionary; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-16
Note: Received April 1998/Final version September 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability (1993)
Working Paper: Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability (1993)
Working Paper: Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability (1993)
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