Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium

William Sandholm

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 107-116

Abstract: A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a ${1 \over k}$-dominant strategy which is initially played by a positive fraction of the population. Then if the population size is large enough, play converges to the ${1 \over k}$-dominant equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-10
Note: Received December 1999/Revised version November 2000
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Working Paper: Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium (1999)
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