On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities

Carsten Helm

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 146 pages

Abstract: This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that agents react to a blocking coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. A non-empty core of this game is established by showing that the game is balanced. The proof relies only on standard convexity assumptions and, therefore, substantially generalizes the results in Chander and Tulkens (1997).

Keywords: coalitional; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-10
Note: Received June 2000/Revised version March 2001
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