Repeated communication through the mechanism

Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 60 pages

Abstract: We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

Date: 2001-10-10
Note: Received December 1998/Final version November 2000
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