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A value for mixed action-set games

Emilio Calvo () and Juan Carlos Santos ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 78 pages

Abstract: We extend the Aumann-Shapley value to mixed action-set games, i.e., multilevel TU games where there are simultaneously two types of players: discrete players that possess a finite number of activity levels in which they can join a coalition, and continuous players that possess a continuum of levels.

Keywords: Mixed action-set games; Aumann-Shapley value; indivisibilities; multichoice games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-10
Note: Received February 1999/Final version October 2000
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