A value for mixed action-set games
Emilio Calvo () and
Juan Carlos Santos ()
International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 78 pages
We extend the Aumann-Shapley value to mixed action-set games, i.e., multilevel TU games where there are simultaneously two types of players: discrete players that possess a finite number of activity levels in which they can join a coalition, and continuous players that possess a continuum of levels.
Keywords: Mixed action-set games; Aumann-Shapley value; indivisibilities; multichoice games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received February 1999/Final version October 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:61-78
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().