On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs

Francis Chu and Joseph Halpern ()
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Francis Chu: Department of Computer Science, Upson Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7501, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 1, 99-106

Abstract: Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player has an expected payoff of at least r is NP-complete as a function of the number of nodes in the extensive-form representation of the game.

Date: 2001-10-10
Note: Received January 2001/Final version May 1, 2001
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Working Paper: On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs (2000)
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