Inferior players in simple games

Mika Widgrén and Stefan Napel

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 2, 209-220

Abstract: Power indices like those of Shapley and Shubik (1954) or Banzhaf (1965) measure the distribution of power in simple games. This paper points at a deficiency shared by all established indices: players who are inferior in the sense of having to accept (almost) no share of the spoils in return for being part of a winning coalition are assigned substantial amounts of power. A strengthened version of the dummy axiom based on a formalized notion of inferior players is a possible remedy. The axiom is illustrated first in a deterministic and then a probabilistic setting. With three axioms from the Banzhaf index, it uniquely characterizes the Strict Power Index (SPI). The SPI is shown to be a special instance of a more general family of power indices based on the inferior player axiom.

Keywords: cooperative; games; ·; power; indices; ·; coalition; formation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-17
Note: Received: December 1999/Final version: June 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030002/10300209.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Inferior Players in Simple Games (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:209-220

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().