3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

Jérôme Renault

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 2, 245 pages

Abstract: We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

Keywords: repeated; games; ·; incomplete; information; ·; lack; of; information; on; one; side; ·; 3; players; ·; uniform; equilibrium; ·; existence; of; equilibria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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