Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games

Eilon Solan ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 2, 259-277

Abstract: A general communication device is a device that at every stage of the game receives a private message from each player, and in return sends a private signal to each player; the signals the device sends depend on past play, past signals it sent, and past messages it received. An autonomous correlation device is a general communication device where signals depend only on past signals the device sent, but not on past play or past messages it received. We show that the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include a general communication device coincides with the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include an autonomous correlation device. A stronger result is obtained when the punishment level is independent of the history.

Keywords: Stochastic; games; ·; general; communication; device; ·; extensive; form; correlated; equilibrium; ·; correlation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-17
Note: received. An autonomous correlation device is a general communication device where signals depend only on past signals the device sent, but not on past play or past messages it received. We show that the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include a general communication device coincides with the set of all equilibrium payoffs in extended games that include an autonomous correlation device. A stronger result is obtained when the punishment level is independent of the history.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030002/10300259.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:259-277

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().