On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma

Noritsugu Nakanishi

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 30, issue 2, 307 pages

Abstract: We show that there exist von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in a n-player version of the prisoners' dilemma game with preplay negotiations in which every player can deviate unilaterally from the currently proposed combination of actions but can not do so jointly with other players, and that every vN-M stable set includes at least one Pareto-efficient outcome. The negotiation among the players is formulated as the "individual contingent threats situation" within the framework of the theory of social situations due to Greenberg (1990). The method of proving the existence also provides us with a step-by-step method of constructing the vN-M stable set.

Keywords: Preplay; negotiation; ·; von; Neumann-Morgenstern; stable; set; ·; Prisoners'; dilemma; ·; Social; situations; ·; Pareto; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-17
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030002/10300291.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:291-307

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().