An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property

Rene van den Brink ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 3, 309-319

Abstract: In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games.

Keywords: TU-game; ·; Shapley; value; ·; fairness; ·; simple; games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-20
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